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The Digital Arsenal

Chainsaw: Triage Windows Event Logs With Sigma Rules and Preserve the Evidence

WithSecure's open-source Chainsaw searches Windows EVTX files and other forensic artifacts. Learn evidence handling, Sigma mapping, validation and false-positive limits.

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The Digital Arsenal | Research-based tool profile | November 19, 2026. A compromised workstation does not always have a complete endpoint-detection product installed. Windows Event Logs may still provide clues about suspicious logons, service changes, new accounts and other activity. Chainsaw, an open-source command-line tool maintained by WithSecure’s open-source organization, is designed to search Windows forensic artifacts quickly and apply Sigma and custom detection rules.

The project supports Windows Event Log analysis, and its documentation also describes work with the MFT, Shimcache, Amcache, registry and SRUM artifacts. Its output can help an investigator prioritize evidence when full SIEM infrastructure is unavailable; it does not replace a comprehensive investigation or prove that a particular user or attacker performed an action.

What Chainsaw actually does

Chainsaw accepts collected forensic files, parses the supported formats, and supports both straightforward searches and detection-rule-driven hunts. For Windows logs, Sigma rules provide portable detection logic; a mapping file connects a Sigma rule’s expected fields to attributes in the specific Event Log sources.

The project’s example mapping covers common events such as Sysmon process creation (event ID 1), Sysmon network connections (ID 3), Windows Security process creation (ID 4688), PowerShell script-block logging (ID 4104) and service creation (ID 7045). The presence of a supported mapping does not establish that the relevant event was enabled or recorded on the machine being examined.

Start by protecting the original evidence

  • Collect logs from systems you are authorized to investigate using a documented method and record the collection time, host identity and original file paths.
  • Preserve untouched copies and calculate cryptographic hashes before further processing; conduct analysis on verified copies.
  • Document whether the files are complete or affected by rollover, retention limits, time-setting changes or earlier cleanup.
  • Use a trusted release of Chainsaw and separately obtained Sigma rules. Record the versions and sources of both the parser and rule set.
  • Keep evidence, outputs and personal data under appropriate access controls and retention policies.

A reproducible first hunt

WithSecure’s documentation provides a command of the form ./chainsaw hunt EVTX-ATTACK-SAMPLES/ -s sigma/ --mapping mappings/sigma-event-logs-all.yml. This is a documented sample-data workflow, not an instruction to test against someone else’s machine. Use a copy of your organization’s authorized EVTX records or a legitimate public sample set, and check the installed tool’s version and command syntax before execution.

Review a small number of results and examine each against the original event record: source computer, event ID, timestamp, account, process and surrounding log activity. Compare the rule logic with the raw fields. If the rules expect process-command-line telemetry that a host never collected, explain that gap rather than declaring the machine clean.

Common errors that invalidate an investigation

A detection match is an investigative lead, not a conviction or proof of malware. Administrative software, approved remote-support activity and scheduled deployment tools may trigger suspicious-looking sequences. Conversely, missing audit policies or altered logs can cause false negatives. Time-zone conversions, event timestamps and account identifiers must be handled consistently across systems.

Chainsaw’s primary role is rapid triage of collected artifacts. It is not a continuously active endpoint response system and should not be the sole source for containment decisions. Corroborate relevant findings using endpoint state, identity data, process lineage, network logs and change records.

What this review does and does not claim

This article is based on the project README and maintained documentation, reviewed November 19, 2026. IPCRIME has not benchmarked throughput, accuracy or detection coverage, and has not reproduced a real incident with this software. The published command is an upstream example; features and flags may differ between releases.

Sources

WithSecureOpenSource Chainsaw — official repository; Chainsaw project wiki; Project usage examples.

Editorial note

IPCRIME distinguishes public records and documented findings from allegations, analysis and commentary. Report corrections through our contact page.