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CISA adds exploited flaws in LiteLLM, Synology, Apache Axis and REDCap

CISA added four exploited vulnerabilities on November 18. Check LiteLLM, Synology, Apache Axis and REDCap deployments against vendor remediation guidance.

CISA adds exploited flaws in LiteLLM, Synology, Apache Axis and REDCap
PUBLISHED

CISA’s official Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog added four entries on November 18, 2026: Synology DSM CVE-2024-10441, BerriAI LiteLLM CVE-2026-40217, Vanderbilt REDCap CVE-2026-90817 and Apache Axis CVE-2026-90436. The catalog was released at 19:17 UTC.

The additions establish a known-exploitation priority for these flaws. They do not identify a single campaign connecting all four products, and each entry lists ransomware use as unknown. The new development is their catalog inclusion; some vendor fixes substantially predate November 18.

Vendor fixes and product-specific scope

Synology’s advisory, originally published in November 2024, identifies CVE-2024-10441 in BeeStation OS before 1.1-65374 and DSM before the applicable branch fixes: 7.2-64570-4, 7.2.1-69057-6 or 7.2.2-72806-1. Administrators should match the device’s exact branch to the vendor guidance.

BerriAI’s May 7 LiteLLM advisory describes a custom-code sandbox escape requiring a proxy-admin credential in default configurations. Its remediation text recommends 1.83.11 or later, although the page’s version metadata lists 1.83.10 as patched. Follow the explicit upgrade recommendation and confirm the deployed package.

The Axis entry also matters to some Confluence deployments. Atlassian identifies CVE-2026-90436 in the Apache Axis component used by Confluence when the Remote API is enabled. Confluence 9.2.28 contains the fix; 10.x and Cloud are unaffected. See our existing Confluence investigation coverage for that product context.

REDCap administrators should obtain version-specific remediation through the official community and institutional support channel. A publicly accessible fixed build was not verified for this report; none is inferred here.

IPCRIME analysis: verify exposure and completion

Start with the systems your organization actually operates, including software embedded in another product. Give each matching asset an owner, then record its configuration, support status and applicable supplier notice. That avoids an apparent match being dismissed because the catalog uses a component name rather than the commercial product’s name.

Combine the update with an evidence review appropriate to the affected service. Preserve relevant logs before maintenance, investigate suspicious administrative activity and verify the running version afterward. A patch closes a vulnerability; it does not establish that an earlier intrusion never occurred. Escalate confirmed compromise through the organization’s incident-response process.

Featured image: conceptual IPCRIME artwork, not a photograph or screenshot of this incident or product.

Editorial note

IPCRIME distinguishes public records and documented findings from allegations, analysis and commentary. Report corrections through our contact page.